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Individual values, cultural embeddedness, and anti-immigration sentiment: Explaining 
differences in the effect of values on attitudes toward immigration across Europe 
 
Abstract 
During the last decade, many European countries have faced sizeable immigration inflows 
accompanied by high prevalence of negative sentiments toward immigrants among majority 
members of the host societies. We propose that basic human values are one important 
determinant of such negative attitudes, and we seek to explain variation across countries in the 
strength of the effects of values. Based on Schwartz’ (1992, 1994) basic human value theory, 
we hypothesize that universalism values are conducive to positive attitudes toward 
immigration, while conformity-tradition reinforce anti-immigration sentiments. We 
furthermore hypothesize that these value effects are moderated by two contextual variables. 
Both value effects are expected to be weaker in countries with a higher level of cultural 
embeddedness. Furthermore, negative effects of conformity-tradition values are hypothesized 
to be cushioned by a lower proportion of immigrants in the country. A multilevel analysis of 
data from 24 countries from the fourth round of the European Social Survey (2008-2009) 
supports these hypotheses. Moreover, we demonstrate that the measurement properties of the 
theoretical constructs exhibit equivalence across countries, thereby justifying statistical 
comparisons.  
 
Key words: basic human values; attitudes toward immigration; multilevel analysis; cross-level 
interaction; European Social Survey; measurement equivalence 
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1. Introduction 
European countries have faced a constant increase of immigration in recent decades (Hooghe, 
Trappers, Meuleman and Reeskens 2008). Approximately 3.4 million people immigrated into 
countries belonging to the EU-27 in 2004, the number increased to 3.8 million in 2008, and 
this trend appears to be continuing.1 Not surprisingly, substantial sociological research has 
been devoted to understanding the consequences and implications of this upsurge in 
migration. Much of this research has focused on one implication that is considered 
particularly worrisome, i.e., the level of anti-immigrant sentiment among members of the host 
societies. Several studies reveal a rapid rise and/or a high level of anti-foreigner sentiment: 
Substantial proportions of the population of host societies favor denying equal rights to 
immigrants and perceive them as a threat to social cohesion and order, culture, and traditions, 
and their economic well-being (Raijman, Davidov, Schmidt, and Hochman 2008; Scheepers, 
Gijsberts, and Coenders 2002; Schlüter, Schmidt, and Wagner 2008). In many European 
countries the popularity of anti-immigrant politicians or parties has risen and public opinion 
has shifted to a less welcoming position (Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers 2002). 
Previous research has sought to delineate the mechanisms underlying the genesis of 
negative attitudes of majority members toward immigrants. It has focused on both individual 
and contextual determinants of such attitudes. A first line of research maintains that 
socioeconomic vulnerability, reflected in low education levels, weak labor market positions, 
and economic deprivation, accounts for the negative attitudes. Various studies have tested 
these propositions with international datasets like the European Social Survey and conclude 
that vulnerable individuals fear losing their jobs due to competition from newcomers to the 
labor market who are willing to accept lower wages (Gorodzeisky 2011; Kunovich 2004; 
                                                                
ENDNOTES 
1 See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/ 
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Pichler 2010; Raijman, Semyonov, and Schmidt 2003; Semyonov and Glikman 2009; 
Semoyonov, Raijman, and Gorodzeisky 2006, 2008). Yet some studies also demonstrate 
reductions of perceived threat due to contact with immigrants (e.g., Semyonov and Glikman, 
2009). 
A second line of research proposes that ideological dispositions are an important 
source of anti-immigrant attitudes and that political conservatism mobilizes negative 
sentiments that induce hostility to and prejudice against immigrants. Empirical studies have 
demonstrated repeatedly that right-wing individuals tend to reject immigration more strongly 
(Gorodzeisky 2011; Raijman et al. 2003; Semyonov et al. 2006, 2008).  
A third set of studies explains the emergence of anti-immigrant prejudice as due to 
contextual variables that affect negative attitudes directly or that moderate the effects of 
individual-level variables. These studies suggest that unfavorable economic conditions on the 
country level accompanied by large-scale immigration are perceived as a threat to the 
economy and may induce hostile attitudes (Gorodzeisky 2011; Meuleman, Davidov, and 
Billiet, 2009; Pichler 2010; Quillian 1995, 1996; Scheepers et al. 2002; Semyonov et al. 
2006). Other contextual variables identified as sources of hostile attitudes are negative media 
coverage (Schlüter and Davidov 2011) and national immigration policies (Schlüter, 
Meuleman and Davidov 2013; Weldon 2006).  
In recent years, a number of authors have also noted the important role that human 
values play in the explanation of negative attitudes toward immigrants (Davidov and 
Meuleman 2012; Davidov, Meuleman, Billiet, and Schmidt 2008a; Sagiv and Schwartz 1995; 
Schwartz 2006a, 2007). These studies adopted Schwartz’ (1992) definition of basic human 
values as beliefs about the importance of broad goals as guiding principles in life. They used 
individual differences in values to explain negative attitudes toward immigrants over and 
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above the effects of social structural position. Values are found to exert robust effects, some 
of which varied across countries. 
Research has yet to examine the conditions that affect the influence of basic human 
values on attitudes toward immigration, that is, the circumstances under which values 
contribute more or less to the explanation of anti-immigrant sentiments. Nor have researchers 
proposed a theory that might explain the variation in value effects across countries. This study 
investigates variation in the effects of values on attitudes toward immigration across 24 
European countries from different European regions. We will argue that an aspect of cultural 
values—cultural embeddedness (Schwartz 2006), that is, the extent to which individuals in 
the society are expected to strive toward shared goals rather than their own—serves as a 
moderator of the impact of values on anti-immigration attitudes. By trying to explain variation 
in the effect of individual values on attitudes toward immigration across countries in a 
systematic way, our study contributes to a better understanding of the conditions under which 
values are more prominent in explaining negative sentiments toward immigration.  
To test these hypotheses empirically, we utilize an internationally comparable dataset 
that includes large samples from many European countries, the European Social Survey (ESS; 
Jowell, Roberts, Fitzgerald, and Gillian 2007). We derive latent variables that take 
measurement errors into account (Bollen 1989) for our main theoretical constructs, and we 
test the equivalence of our constructs across countries (Billiet 2003). Testing for construct 
equivalence has rarely been practiced in studies that apply multilevel analysis, although such 
equivalence is a necessary condition for a meaningful interpretation of multilevel analyses 
(Kim, Kwok, and Yoon 2012). Before turning to the empirical analyses, we present the 
theoretical background and propositions of the study.    
 
2. Theoretical considerations 
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2.1 The value theory 
Human values are ‘desirable transsituational goals, varying in importance, that serve 
as guiding principles in the life of a person or other social entity’ (Schwartz 1994: 21). 
Individuals’ values are ordered in a hierarchy of importance that is quite stable across time 
and situations.2. Schwartz (1992)3 has postulated that the full range of values recognized 
across societies form a motivational continuum; extensive research in over 80 countries has 
supported this theory that distinguishes 10 values (universalism, benevolence, tradition, 
conformity, security, power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction). We will 
focus on the two values universalism and the unified value conformity-tradition, because they 
have been found to predict attitudes toward immigration4 (Davidov and Meuleman 2012; 
Davidov et al. 2008a; Sagiv and Schwartz 1995; Schwartz 2007). 
 
2.2 Relations of values to attitudes toward immigration 
2.2.1 The individual level 
                                                                
2 In contrast to values, attitudes are not ordered hierarchically, are less stable, and refer to positive and negative 
evaluations of objects rather than to the importance of goals (Rokeach 1968; Schwartz 2006a). Values, but not 
attitudes, serve as standards to judge people, actions, and events. 
3 We employ the Schwartz value theory rather than the Inglehart theory (e.g., Inglehart and Baker 2000) mainly 
for three reasons. First, Schwartz (1992, 1994) makes a better theoretical and empirical distinction between 
values and attitudes. Such a distinction is crucial for using values to explain attitudes and for guaranteeing 
discriminant validity between the concepts. Second, Schwartz makes a clear distinction between individual-level 
and societal-level values whereas Inglehart does not make such a distinction on the measurement level. We 
propose mechanisms to explain attitudes toward immigration on the individual level. Therefore, the Schwartz 
theory is better suited to test them empirically. Finally, the database we chose to test our propositions is the 
European Social Survey, which includes measures of anti-immigrant sentiments across a large set of European 
countries. This dataset included measurements for Schwartz’ rather than Inglehart’s values. See Becker, Siegers, 
and Kuntz (2012) and Datler, Jagodzinski, and Schmidt (in press) for a discussion about differences between the 
two theories. 
4 In many empirical studies it was not possible to distinguish between tradition and conformity (see, e.g., 
Davidov 2010). Therefore, we decided to unify them in this study. This does not contradict the theory due to 
their shared motivation and proximal location in the value space. We did not use security as a predictor because 
of the different meaning it may have across countries which may lead to conceptual confusion. Furthermore, in 
additional exploratory analyses, security only has a relatively small effect because of its close content to 
conformity and tradition.  
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What mechanism links values to attitudes toward immigration? Values whose expression, 
attainment, or motivation may be promoted or blocked by immigration to a country are likely to 
affect attitudes toward immigration (Sagiv and Schwartz 1995). This mechanism is particularly 
relevant for two values, namely, universalism and conformity-tradition. Universalism values 
express the motivation to appreciate differences among individuals as well as to understand, 
tolerate, and protect the welfare of all people, with an emphasis on the weak and vulnerable 
who are different from the self (Schwartz 2006a). Admitting immigrants who left or even fled 
their country of birth in search of a better life provides opportunities to realize the goal of 
promoting the welfare of the weak and vulnerable. Therefore, we expect a positive effect of 
universalism on attitudes toward immigration (H1). 
In contrast, we hypothesize that tradition and conformity values lead to negative 
attitudes toward immigration (H2). This is because these values express the motivation to 
maintain the beliefs, customs, and practices of one’s culture and family and to avoid violation 
of conventional expectations and norms. The arrival of newcomers threatens the attainment of 
these values because immigrants from different cultures are liable to introduce new and 
unfamiliar practices and beliefs, to question common norms and conventions or to violate 
them out of ignorance, and to bring about change in the existing societal order.  
Previous individual-level research has demonstrated the effects of the values universalism, 
tradition, and conformity on attitudes toward immigration in numerous countries (e.g., 
Davidov et al. 2008a; Davidov and Meuleman 2012; Sagiv and Schwartz 1995; Schwartz 
2007). The current study will provide a rigorous test of Hypotheses 1 and 2 by trying to 
replicate the finding across 24 countries. But at the same time, we take current knowledge a 
step further by addressing the following questions: How do value effects vary across 
countries, and how can this variation be explained?  
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2.2.2 Variability in value effects 
The above hypotheses and the reasoning underlying them are stated as applicable 
across societies. We expect, however, that the strength of the effects of these basic human 
values varies across societies. In order for values to affect attitudes and behavior, they must be 
activated in specific situations or contexts (Schwartz 2006a). Contextual variables are likely 
to influence the intensity with which values relevant to immigration attitudes are activated.   
The first contextual variable we consider is cultural embeddedness, a cultural 
dimension for comparing societies (Schwartz 2006b). In so-called ‘embedded cultures’, 
people are viewed as entities embedded in the collectivity. Meaning in life comes largely 
through social relationships, through identifying with the group, participating in its shared 
way of life, and striving toward its shared goals rather than pursuing one’s own goals. 
Embedded cultures emphasize maintaining the status quo and restraining individuals’ actions 
that might disrupt in-group solidarity or the traditional order. In contrast, in less embedded 
cultures, people are viewed as autonomous entities who are encouraged to cultivate and 
express their own preferences, feelings, ideas, and abilities, and to find meaning in their own 
uniqueness.  
Embeddedness assumes that a person’s roles in and obligations to collectivities are 
more important than her unique ideas and aspirations, and in less embedded societies 
individuals are encouraged to express their uniqueness and independence in thought, action, 
and feelings (Schwartz 2006b). As such, cultural embeddedness should be distinguished from 
Hofstede’s (2001) concept of collectivism: Whereas collectivism refers to the way in which 
individuals and the surrounding group are actually related, embeddedness refers in addition to 
the norms that dictate how they should be related.5 
                                                                
5 Our choice to focus on cultural embeddedness rather than on collectivism is not only justified based on 
theoretical considerations, but is also supported by empirical arguments. We reproduced the analyses presented 
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This analytical framework implies that individuals’ personal values are more likely to 
be salient, to be activated rather than suppressed, and to influence their attitudes and behavior 
in societies with less embedded cultures. Lesthaeghe and Moors (2000: 11) also inferred that 
‘value orientations are … predictive for choices… in contexts with … high degrees of 
individual autonomy’. On these bases, we hypothesize that values have stronger effects on 
attitudes toward immigration in less embedded societies (H3).  
Our second contextual variable is the proportion of immigrants in a country. Group 
threat theory posits that people who live in conditions of intense competition for scarce goods 
are more likely to perceive immigrants as a threat (Stephan et al. 2005; Coenders 2001; 
Scheepers et al. 2002; Quillian 1995, 1996). A high proportion of immigrants in a country has 
been associated with negative attitudes toward immigration at the country level (Scheepers et 
al. 2002; Semyonov et al. 2006). We hypothesize that this is also the case across the 24 
European countries we study here (H4). Empirical evidence for an effect of the proportion of 
immigrants on attitudes toward immigration is mixed with some authors finding support while 
others do not. For example, Quillian (1995, 1996) or Coenders, Gijsberts and Scheepers 
(2004) found supportive evidence for the effect of immigrant group size, but Semyonov, 
Raijman, Yom-Tov, and Schmidt (2004) or Strabac and Listhaug (2008) did not. The test of 
Hypothesis 4 in the current study provides a rigorous test of this effect across numerous 
countries. 
Yet more central to the purpose of this study, we hypothesize that the higher the 
proportion of immigrants in the country, the stronger the negative effect of conformity and 
tradition on attitudes toward immigration will be (H5). As noted above, immigration threatens 
the attainment of these values by introducing new and unfamiliar practices and beliefs. It 
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
below using collectivism as a moderator for value effects (results not shown but are available upon request). 
Cross-level interactions for collectivism are insignificant (with Tradition-Conformity) or considerably weaker 
than is the case for cultural embeddedness. 
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increases the number of people who may question or violate common norms and conventions. 
The greater the proportion of immigrants from dissimilar cultural backgrounds, the greater the 
pressure for change in the societal institutions that people who emphasize conformity and 
tradition values cherish. Hence, we expect that these values will then show a stronger 
relationship with anti-immigration sentiment. 
There is mixed evidence for an effect of immigration levels on relations of values to 
immigration attitudes. Davidov et al. (2008a) found that values had a weaker effect on 
attitudes in countries with higher immigration levels. But Davidov and Meuleman (2012) 
found no variation across countries that differed in immigration levels in the effects of 
conservation values on immigration attitudes. Immigration levels are not equivalent to the 
proportion of immigrants. However, the two are sufficiently related so that the mixed findings 
for the former are relevant to the interaction of the latter with values that we predicted (H5). 
No studies have examined the possible cross-level interaction effect of cultural embeddedness 
on relations of individual values with attitudes toward immigration which are postulated in 
H3.  
 
3. Data and measurement 
3.1 Data 
The analyses utilize the data of the fourth round (2008-2009) of the European Social Survey 
(ESS) (Jowell et al. 2007). In each of 24 European countries, strict probability samples of the 
noninstitutionalized populations aged 15 years and older were selected. In all, 41,965 
respondents reported their attitudes and opinions regarding various social and political issues, 
their basic values, and a full list of background variables. The following countries, with their 
abbreviation and effective sample sizes in parentheses, were included in the analyses: 
Belgium (BE; 1,586), Bulgaria (BG; 2,210), Cyprus (CY; 1,119), Czech Republic (CZ; 
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1,968), Denmark (DK; 1,505), Estonia (EE; 1,207), Finland (FI; 2,138), France (FR; 1,907), 
Germany (DE; 2,501), Great Britain (GB; 2,100), Greece (GR; 1,946), Hungary (HU; 1,513), 
Ireland (IE; 1,476), Latvia (LV; 1,643), Netherlands (NL; 1,602), Norway (NO; 1,412), 
Poland (PL; 1,595), Portugal (PT; 2,228), Romania (RO; 2,007), Slovakia (SK; 1,755), 
Slovenia (SI; 1,175), Spain (ES; 2,341), Sweden (SE; 1,611), and Switzerland (CH; 1,368).6  
 
3.2 Variables 
Attitudes toward Immigration. Respondents were asked three questions: To what 
extent do you think [your country] should allow people (1) of the same race or ethnic group 
(2) of a different race or ethnic group (3) from poorer countries outside Europe, to come and 
live in your country? Response categories ranged from 1 (allow many to come and live here) 
to 4 (allow none). We recoded responses so that higher scores indicate greater willingness to 
allow immigrants into the country. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) (Bollen 1989; 
Jöreskog 1971) demonstrated that the three questions load positively and strongly on a single 
factor. These questions were averaged to form an index that we named Allow. 
Values. The ESS Human Values Scale is a modification of the Portrait Values 
Questionnaire (Schwartz 2007). It includes brief verbal portraits of 21 different people, 
gender-matched to the respondent. Each portrait describes a person’s goals, aspirations, or 
wishes that point implicitly to the importance of a single value. For example, the following 
item describes a person for whom universalism values are important: “She thinks it is 
important that every person in the world be treated equally. She believes everyone should 
have equal opportunities in life.” For each portrait, respondents answer the question: ‘How 
much like you is this person?’ choosing one of six labeled boxes ranging from ‘very much 
                                                                
6 For further documentation about the data collection procedures, see http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/. 
Data can be downloaded from http://ess.nsd.uib.no/. 
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like me’ (1) to ‘not like me at all’ (6). Respondents’ own values are inferred from their self-
reported similarity to people who are described in terms of particular values. We reversed the 
scores so that higher scores indicate greater value importance.  
We used the three universalism items that tap the importance of tolerance, equality, 
and environmental concern, two tradition items that tap the importance of tradition, customs, 
religion, and modesty, and two conformity items that tap the importance of following rules, 
doing what one is told, and behaving properly. In CFA analyses, all items loaded strongly on 
their respective value factor. We therefore averaged the items to form two indices that we 
named Universalism (UN) and Conformity-Tradition (COTR). 
Cultural Embeddedness. In each country, we utilized scores based on responses of 
urban school teachers and university students to the Schwartz Value Survey (for details see 
Schwartz 2006b). School teachers’ values are considered a good proxy of society’s values as 
in their educational function in schools they are expected to convey and disseminate norms 
and values among young pupils and future generations. Data were gathered between 1990 and 
2007. Evidence in Schwartz (2006b) reveals very little change in cultural embeddedness 
scores across extended periods of time even in countries that underwent major political and 
institutional change. We therefore combined the data from this whole period for the index. 
The items included were validated empirically as indicators of cultural embeddedness by 
means of multidimensional scaling with countries as the unit of analysis (Schwartz 2006b). 
The cultural embeddedness score was the average ratings in each country of the importance of 
15 value items: social order, tradition, forgiving, obedience, politeness, being moderate, 
honoring elders, national security, cleanliness, devoutness, wisdom, self-discipline, protection 
of one’s public image, family security, and reciprocation of favors.  
Both the individual values and the country scores for embeddedness were derived 
from questionnaires distributed among individuals. However, embeddedness is a 
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characteristic of national cultures on which societies differ whereas conformity and tradition 
values are variables on which individuals differ. The former refers to the prescriptions in a 
society for how people should relate, the latter to the goals that motivate individuals. The 
former emerges in analyses in which country means are the unit of analysis, the latter emerge 
in analyses in which individuals' value priorities are the unit of analysis. These two levels of 
analysis are conceptually and statistically independent. Moreover, the value items that fit 
together in theory and emerge empirically to measure conformity-tradition and cultural 
embeddedness, while partially overlapping, differ in a number of particulars. Of the 15 
embeddedness items, seven measure individual values from conformity-tradition, but the 
other seven measure security, power, benevolence, and universalism values at the individual 
level. The latter include, for example, 'wisdom' and 'forgiving'.7 
Proportion of Immigrants in a Country. We operationalized this variable as the 
percentage of non-EU immigrants (foreign born) in the population of each country.8 The data 
for 2007 were downloaded from the website of the MIMOSA project 
(http://mimosa.gedap.be/). 
Control Variables. Gender was scored 0 for males and 1 for females. Age was 
measured in years. Education was measured by the highest level of education achieved (0 = 
no education up to 5 = tertiary education completed). Subjective income was measured by 
responses to the question “Which of the descriptions … comes closest to how you feel about 
your household's income nowadays?” on a 4-point scale (1 = living comfortably on present 
income, 4 = finding it very difficult on present income). Political orientation was measured by 
                                                                
7 Data on embeddedness across countries may be provided by the 4th author upon request. 
8 The two countries with the largest share of non-EU immigrants are Estonia and Latvia. These countries host a 
very large minority group of ethnic Russians who have lived there for an extended period of time but did not 
receive citizenship after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Because of this specific context in the Baltic States, the 
percentage of non-EU immigrants might represent a different reality and our indicator might lack comparability. 
To rule out the possibility that this distorts our conclusions, we replicated all analyses in this paper excluding 
Estonia and Latvia. Results (available upon request) are virtually identical, and do not alter the conclusions.   
16 
 
self-placement on a 0 (left) to 10 (right) scale. Finally, religiosity was measured by responses 
to the question “…how religious would you say you are?” on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all 
religious) to 10 (very religious).  
 
3.3 Modeling strategy 
We used multilevel analysis to take account of the two-level structure of the data, 
where individuals are nested within countries. We estimated a series of increasingly more 
complex models as proposed by Hox (2010). After estimating a so-called empty model, we 
included the sociodemographic variables as control variables. In the third model, we added 
the universalism and conformity-tradition values at the individual level and the cultural 
embeddedness score and the percentage of non-EU immigrants at the country level. Finally, 
we included random slopes for the values and cross-level interactions to test the hypothesized 
variations in the effect of individual values across countries. 
We estimated all models with the restricted maximum likelihood procedure 
implemented in SPSS 19. To deal with item nonresponse, we used multiple imputation (Rubin 
1996; Schafer 1997). All variables were standardized (over the pooled dataset), so all effects 
can be interpreted as standardized effects (Hox 2010; Snijders and Bosker 1994). 
Furthermore, the two value scales were group-mean centered (Hox 2010: 68) before 
standardization, in order to avoid confusion between processes operating at the individual and 
country level. This procedure guarantees that the interaction effects we observe are actually 
cross-level interactions (as our theoretical framework predicts) rather than interactions at the 
country level (Hofmann and Gavin 1998). 
 
4. Results 
4.1 Testing for equivalence 
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As a first step, we ensured that our measurement of attitudes toward immigration and 
of individual values of universalism and conformity-tradition, our main constructs, were 
equivalent across countries (Billiet 2003). Equivalence of concepts is a necessary condition 
before cross-cultural studies may be meaningfully conducted. In line with previous studies 
(Davidov 2008; Davidov and Meuleman 2012; Davidov, Schmidt, and Schwartz 2008b), we 
employed multiple group confirmatory factor analysis (MGCFA: Bollen 1989; Brown 2006; 
Jöreskog 1971) to test for measurement equivalence across the 24 groups (countries) in this 
study. The tests supported full metric and partial scalar equivalence, thereby permitting 
meaningful interpretation of a multilevel analysis (Davidov 2010).9 
 
4.2 Descriptive overview 
Table 1 provides country averages for the scales measuring attitudes toward 
immigration (Allow) and value priorities (Universalism and Conformity-Tradition) as well as 
scores on the two contextual variables (cultural embeddedness and the proportion of non-EU 
immigrants). 
Table 1 about here 
Willingness to accept immigrants varied substantially across countries. Attitudes were 
most positive in Sweden, followed by Poland, Norway, Germany, and Bulgaria. Rejection of 
immigration was strongest in Greece followed by Latvia, Hungary, Portugal, and to a lesser 
extent, Cyprus and the Czech Republic. As shown in Table 1, the mean willingness score 
varied considerably across countries. The difference between the most (Sweden) and least 
(Greece) positive country was 1.46, which is considerable knowing that this is a standardized 
variable. The multilevel analysis sheds light on the sources of variation in willingness to 
accept immigrants both within countries and between them. 
                                                                
9 The full analyses are available from the first author. 
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Embeddedness varied considerably across countries as well. Scores were highest in 
Latvia, Estonia, Cyprus, Bulgaria, and Poland and lowest in Germany, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, and Denmark. In the former countries we expect values to exert stronger effects 
whereas in the latter we expect them to operate less strongly. 
 
4.3 Multilevel analysis 
The results of the series of multilevel model analyses are reported in Tables 2 (Models 
1 – 4) and 3 (Models 5 – 7). 
 
Table 2 about here 
 
Model 1 included only a random intercept to enable us to determine how much of the 
variance in the dependent variable is accounted for by individual-level variability and how 
much by between-country variability. Twelve percent of the variance is due to country-level 
variability; hence, it is important to use multilevel analysis (Hox 2010). 
Model 2 regressed Allow (the index of attitude toward immigration) on the 
sociodemographic variables gender, age, education, and subjective income. Compared to the 
empty model, the individual- and country-level variances dropped by 5.0% and 17%, 
respectively, indicating that these variables explain considerable variance on both levels of 
analysis. Women and those with higher education and income were more positive toward 
immigration whereas older people were considerably more negative. These findings are in 
line with what has been reported in the literature (e.g., Semyonov et al. 2006). 
Model 3 added the individual values of universalism and conformity-tradition and also 
level of religiosity and left-right political orientation. These individual characteristics added to 
the explanation of variance in attitudes toward immigration over and above the effects of the 
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sociodemographic variables, primarily at the individual level. In line with previous studies 
(Davidov et al. 2008a; Davidov and Meuleman 2012), attitudes toward immigration were 
more positive among those high in universalism values and low in conformity-tradition 
values. The two basic values had the strongest effects among the individual-level predictors. 
The inclusion of universalism and conformity-tradition is responsible for the lion’s share in 
the drop of residual variance between Models 2 and 3 at the individual level. Furthermore, 
attitudes toward immigration were more positive among more religious individuals and 
among those with left-wing political orientations. This finding is also in line with previous 
studies (see, e.g., Scheepers et al. 2002).  
Model 4 added the macro-level variables, cultural embeddedness levels, and 
percentage of non-EU residents in each country, in order to examine their effect on variation 
between countries in attitudes toward immigration. Based on group threat theory (Quillian 
1995, 1996), we hypothesized that greater proportions of immigrants in a country would 
increase competitive threat and, therefore, lead to rejecting immigration. This hypothesis was 
not confirmed; proportion of immigrants in a country did not account for significant between-
country variability in attitudes to immigration. We had no reason to expect a direct effect of 
cultural embeddedness on attitudes toward immigration, nor did the analysis reveal such an 
effect. Thus, neither contextual variable had a direct effect on attitudes toward immigration.  
Table 3 about here 
Model 5 investigated whether the effect of individual values on attitudes varied across 
countries and, if so, to what extent. In this model, we allowed the slopes of universalism and 
conformity-tradition values to vary across countries. The random slope variances of the two 
values were significant, indicating that the effects of the values do indeed vary across 
countries. The random slope variances provide a clear estimate of the size of the difference in 
the effects of the values. The standard deviation of both random slopes equaled 0.055 
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(namely, the square root of the random slope variances). This indicates that country-specific 
value effects deviate on average by 0.055 from the mean value effects over all countries. 
Inspection of the country-specific value effects (not shown) indicates that – in spite of the 
considerable cross-national variance in effect sizes – the direction of the effects of 
universalism and conformity-tradition values on attitudes toward immigration is the same 
across 24 European countries. 
Subsequently, we examined whether the variation across countries in the effects of 
values could be explained by the contextual variables, thus testing Hypotheses 3 (cultural 
embeddedness) and 5 (percentage of immigrants in country). Because the sample size at the 
country level is quite limited (N = 24), three separate models were estimated, each containing 
one cross-level interaction effect: universalism X cultural embeddedness (Model 6a), 
conformity-tradition X cultural embeddedness (Model 6b), and conformity-tradition X 
percentage non-EU immigrants in the country (Model 6c). Additionally, Figures 1, 2, and 3 
visualize how variation in the effects of the basic individual values is related to the contextual 
variables. The cross-level interaction terms estimate the size of these relationships. 
Figure 1 about here 
Figure 2 about here 
Models 6a and 6b indicate that the interaction terms of cultural embeddedness were 
significant with both conformity-tradition values and with universalism values. Thus, the level 
of cultural embeddedness in a country moderated the effects of universalism and conservation 
on attitudes toward immigration. In less culturally embedded societies, values had stronger 
effects on attitudes. The negative coefficient for the interaction between cultural 
embeddedness and universalism values indicates that the positive main effect of universalism 
values on attitudes toward immigration was weaker in countries high on embeddedness and 
stronger in countries low on embeddedness. The positive coefficient for the interaction 
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between cultural embeddedness and conformity-tradition values indicates that the negative 
main effect of these values on attitudes toward immigration was weaker in countries high on 
embeddedness and stronger in countries low on embeddedness. In sum, in countries high in 
cultural embeddedness, individual values had a weaker effect on attitudes toward 
immigration. Cultural embeddedness can explain 25% of the variation in the effect of 
conformity-tradition and no less than 65% of the variation in the effect of universalism. These 
findings fit the theoretical argument that individual values are more likely to be activated and 
to guide attitudes in less culturally embedded societies, that is, societies whose culture 
encourages pursuing one’s own goals and expressing one’s unique preferences. 
Figure 3 about here 
Model 6c reveals a significant coefficient for the interaction term between the 
percentage of non-EU foreigners in a country and conformity-tradition values. The negative 
coefficient of this interaction indicates that the negative main effect of conformity-tradition 
values on attitudes toward immigration was stronger in countries where the proportion of the 
immigrant population is higher, that is, people high in conformity-tradition values reject 
immigration more strongly in countries with larger immigrant populations, confirming our 
fifth hypothesis. This fits the theoretical argument that a larger proportion of immigrants in a 
country increases the potential for societal change, intensifying the threat experienced by 
people for whom it is especially important to preserve convention, social norms, and customs. 
Consequently, these people reject immigration even more strongly in countries with large 
proportions of immigrants. Sixteen percent of the variability in the effect of conformity-
tradition on attitudes toward immigration was explained by this cross-level interaction.  
Model 7, finally, includes all three cross-level interactions simultaneously. The finding 
that the results are virtually identical to those of Models 6a-6c essentially corroborates the 
robustness of the results.  
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The full set of findings reveals that universalism and conformity-tradition values exert 
strong effects on attitudes toward immigrants in many different countries. Moreover, the 
strength of these effects varies significantly across countries. This variation depends to a 
substantial extent on the level of cultural embeddedness and the proportion of non-EU 
immigrants in each country. 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
European countries have faced a constant increase of immigration in recent decades, 
accompanied by a rapid rise in and/or a high level of anti-foreigner sentiment. In many 
European countries the popularity of anti-immigrant politicians or parties has risen and public 
opinion has shifted to a less welcoming position. This study built upon previous studies that 
have shown the important role of basic human values as determinants of negative attitudes to 
immigrants. We hypothesized that more positive attitudes toward immigration would be 
found among individuals who give higher priority to universalism values, and contrastingly, 
more negative attitudes would be found among individuals who give higher priority to 
conformity-tradition values. The present study sought to explain variation across countries in 
these effects of values on attitudes. We identified two contextual variables likely to explain 
this variation, cultural embeddedness and proportion of immigrants in the population. We 
expected cultural embeddedness to play an important role in moderating these effects across 
countries. 
We hypothesized that the effects of the two basic individual values are weaker in 
societies whose culture is higher on embeddedness (vs. autonomy). The rationale behind this 
cross-level interaction is that in more embedded societies, people are socialized and 
encouraged to maintain group solidarity and to find meaning in life through identifying with 
and pursuing the goals of the groups of which they are members. In less embedded societies 
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they are socialized and encouraged to cultivate their own unique preferences and ideas and to 
pursue their own personal goals. Thus, personal values are more likely to be salient, readily 
activated, and hence to influence attitudes more in less embedded societies. We further 
hypothesized that the negative effect of conformity-tradition values on attitudes toward 
immigration is stronger in countries with a higher percentage of immigrants. Immigrants 
potentially threaten the maintenance of accepted customs, traditions, and norms, and the 
larger the proportion of immigrants the greater the threat to the status quo. This threat directly 
challenges the goals of conformity-tradition values and is, therefore, likely to activate them as 
sources of influence on attitudes. 
To test our hypotheses, we utilized the data of 24 European countries from the fourth 
round of the European Social Survey (2008-2009). We analyzed the data with multilevel 
models because we wished to examine effects at both the individual and country level and to 
test cross-level interactions. Because constructs are not comparable across countries unless 
their measurement is equivalent, we used multigroup confirmatory factor analysis to establish 
the necessary metric and partial scalar equivalence of the value and attitude constructs. This 
permitted meaningful interpretation of the multilevel analysis. 
The analyses largely supported the hypotheses. Previous findings of significant 
effects of universalism, conformity, and tradition values on attitudes toward immigration were 
replicated. Universalism values predicted more positive attitudes and conformity-tradition 
values predicted more negative attitudes. These effects were robust in the sense that they were 
significantly positive (for universalism) and negative (for conformity-tradition) in virtually all 
countries. Nonetheless, the strength of these value effects varied across countries. The 
hypothesized effects of the two country-level contextual variables on the strength of value 
effects were supported by the data. In countries with less embedded cultures, both values had 
stronger effects than in countries with more embedded cultures. Moreover, in countries with 
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higher proportions of non-EU immigrants, the effect on attitudes of conformity-tradition 
values was stronger. The proportion of non-EU immigrants in a country had no direct effect 
on attitudes toward immigration, replicating previous studies (e.g., Semyonov et al. 2004; 
Strabac and Listhaug 2008). 
The findings demonstrated that individuals’ values play an important role in the 
explanation of attitudes toward immigration even after controlling their sociodemographic 
characteristics. Indeed, underlining the significance of values, their effects were stronger than 
the effects of the sociodemographic characteristics in standardized terms. Thus, when 
designing policies to increase public support for immigration, values within the population 
should be taken into account. Values are largely shaped and crystallized during adolescence 
and remain relatively stable thereafter, barring major traumas or therapy (Hitlin and Piliavin 
2004; Inglehart 1997). This suggests that policies should be aimed at young people in order to 
affect the impact of values on attitudes to immigration.  
The findings for cultural embeddedness demonstrate that this cultural dimension 
does not affect attitudes directly. However, its importance and that of the proportion of 
immigrants in the society may primarily be through increasing or decreasing the likelihood 
that the values relevant to attitudes will be activated. Indeed, individuals’ personal values are 
more likely to be salient, to be activated rather than suppressed, and to influence their 
attitudes and behavior in societies with less embedded cultures. Our findings suggest that the 
individual level effects of values are highly robust, yet they are nonetheless moderated.  
This is study is not without limitations. In particular, our conclusions regarding the 
cross-level interaction might be challenged by the fact that this dimension of national culture 
correlates substantively with other contextual variables, such as a lower GDP, a lower human 
development index (HDI), poorer education on average, and having a communist past. Such 
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factors may have reduced the quality of responses to the values questionnaire in high 
embedded countries and as a result could account for the moderation. Unfortunately, the small 
sample size at the country level does not allow us to control for these factors and to rule out 
the possibility that the cross-level interaction is spurious. 
Our findings suggest that variability across countries in attitudes toward immigration 
may be accounted for to a large extent by variability in individual values combined with the 
level of cultural embeddedness and size of the immigrant population in the country. However, 
to understand shifts in such attitudes over time, we may need other explanations. Values tend 
to display high stability over time and do not offer a convincing mechanism for studying 
longitudinal change in anti-immigrant sentiments. Studies suggest instead that worsening 
economic conditions (Semyonov et al. 2006, 2008), immigration policies (Schlüter et al. 
2013) or change in media coverage (Schlüter and Davidov 2011) may offer, at least in part, 
explanations for such longitudinal variation in negative attitudes toward immigration.  
Given the continuing increase of immigration around the world and the persistence 
and growth of negative attitudes toward immigration, it is critical to understand the sources of 
these attitudes. Promoting positive attitudes toward immigration may be beneficial both for 
immigrants and for their receiving societies. In the long run, immigration has generally 
strengthened societies economically (Borjas 1995; Dustmann, Frattini, and Halls 2010), but 
opposition from members of the host society undermines social cohesion. In the present study 
we have (1) identified two relevant values that could be targets of socialization, (2) suggested 
mechanisms through which these values influence attitudes, and (3) investigated the 
circumstances in which these mechanisms operate more strongly. Theorizing that identifies 
other relevant variables and that investigates possible cross-national variation in their effects 
on attitudes toward immigration is needed. Equally important, it is necessary to deal with the 
methodological issue of equivalence of measurement when studying these new variables. By 
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ensuring this critical prerequisite, we were able to study the effects of values on a key attitude 
across countries and to draw reliable conclusions.
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Figure 1. Variation across countries in the effects of conformity-tradition values on attitudes 
toward immigration as a function of the level of cultural embeddedness in the country 
 
Source: ESS 2008-2009, own calculations. For country abbreviations see text. 
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Figure 2. Variation across countries in the effects of universalism values on attitudes toward 
immigration as a function of the level of cultural embeddedness in the country 
 
Source: ESS 2008-2009, own calculations. For country abbreviations see text. 
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Figure 3. Variation across countries in the effects of conformity-tradition values on attitudes 
toward immigration as a function of the percentage of non-EU population in the country  
 
Source: ESS 2008-2009, own calculations. For country abbreviations see text. 
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Table 1. Country Scores for Attitudes Toward Immigration, the Value Scales, and the 
Contextual Variables 
Country 
Allow (country 
average) 
Universalism 
(country 
average) 
Conformity-
Tradition 
(country 
average) 
% non-EU 
foreigners 
Cultural 
Embeddedness 
Score 
BE 0.17 0.12 0.03 6.100 3.25 
BG 0.30 -0.12 0.32 0.39 3.87 
CH 0.28 0.37 -0.29 9.56 3.28 
CY -0.33 0.30 0.43 7.67 4.04 
CZ -0.33 -0.37 -0.10 0.93 3.59 
DE 0.32 0.08 -0.27 7.72 3.06 
DK 0.22 -0.02 -0.25 5.84 3.19 
EE -0.24 -0.19 -0.30 15.56 3.81 
ES -0.24 0.38 0.39 7.53 3.31 
FI 0.00 0.11 -0.16 2.24 3.37 
FR 0.03 0.12 -0.38 7.65 3.20 
GB -0.12 -0.07 -0.16 6.96 3.34 
GR -0.63 0.41 0.45 8.22 3.41 
HU -0.46 0.01 -0.04 0.76 3.60 
IE 0.07 0.20 0.18 3.97 3.41 
LV -0.51 -0.28 -0.07 14.58 4.46 
NL 0.16 -0.03 -0.15 8.34 3.19 
NO 0.37 -0.28 -0.21 5.61 3.45 
PL 0.50 0.05 0.30 1.14 3.86 
PT -0.45 -0.40 -0.19 5.33 3.43 
RO 0.04 -0.24 0.20 0.44 3.78 
SE 0.83 -0.19 -0.41 8.05 3.12 
SI 0.09 0.15 0.21 9.95 3.71 
SK 0.09 0.03 0.43 0.94 3.82 
 
Note:  The Allow, Universalism, and Conformity-Tradition scales are standardized (Note that 
in the multilevel models, the value scales were group-mean centered before standardizing in 
order to guarantee that the interactions with context variables are due to actual cross-level 
interactions rather than macro-level processes). 
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Table 2.Multilevel Models Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigration (Models 1-4) 
  Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 
Fixed effects Par. SE Par. SE Par. SE Par. SE 
Intercept 0.01   0.07 0.00   0.07 0.00   0.07 0.01   0.06
Gender       0.01 * 0.00 -0.01   0.00 -0.01   0.00
Age       -0.12 *** 0.00 -0.11 *** 0.00 -0.11 *** 0.00
Educational level       0.12 *** 0.00 0.10 *** 0.00 0.10 *** 0.00
Subjective income       -0.09 *** 0.01 -0.10 *** 0.01 -0.10 *** 0.01
Conformity-Tradition (COTR)           -0.12 *** 0.01 -0.12 *** 0.01
Universalism (UN)           0.14 *** 0.01 0.14 *** 0.01
Left-right position             -0.08 *** 0.01 -0.08 *** 0.01
Religiosity           0.05 *** 0.01 0.05 *** 0.01
Context variables                      
Embeddedness                   -0.09   0.06
% non-EU immigrants                   -0.07   0.06
Cross-level interactions                         
COTR x embeddedness                         
UN x embeddedness                         
COTR x % non-EU immigrants                         
Variance components                 
Residual variance 0.882 *** 0.006 0.838 *** 0.006 0.809 *** 0.006 0.809 *** 0.006
Random intercept 0.124 ** 0.037 0.103 ** 0.031 0.103 ** 0.030 0.096 ** 0.030
Slope COTR                        
Slope UN                        
Intra Class Correlation 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Explained variance                        
% reduced variance residual   0.05 0.08 0.08 
% reduced variance intercept   0.17 0.17 0.23 
* p < .05  ** p < .01 ***  p< .001              
Source: ESS 2008-2009, own calculations; Ni = 41,965; Nj = 24 
Multiple imputation is used to handle missing data. All entries are standardized effects. 
(COTR = Conformity-Tradition; UN = Universalism) 
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Table 3. Multilevel Models Explaining Attitudes Toward Immigration (Models 5-7) 
  Model5 Model6a Model6b Model6c Model7 
Fixed effects Par. SE Par. SE Par. SE Par. SE Par. SE 
Intercept 0.01   0.06 0.01  0.06 0.01  0.06 0.01   0.06 0.01   0.06
Gender -0.01   0.00 -0.01  0.00 -0.01  0.00 -0.01   0.00 -0.01   0.00
Age -0.11 *** 0.00 -0.11 *** 0.00 -0.11 *** 0.00 -0.11 *** 0.00 -0.11 *** 0.00
Educational level 0.10 *** 0.00 0.10 *** 0.00 0.10 *** 0.00 0.10 *** 0.00 0.10 *** 0.00
Subjective income -0.10 *** 0.01 -0.10 *** 0.01 -0.10 *** 0.01 -0.10 *** 0.01 -0.10 *** 0.01
Tradition-Conformity -0.11 *** 0.01 -0.11 *** 0.01 -0.11 *** 0.01 -0.11 *** 0.01 -0.11 *** 0.01
Universalism 0.14 *** 0.01 0.14 *** 0.01 0.14 *** 0.01 0.14 *** 0.01 0.14 *** 0.01
Left-right position -0.08 *** 0.01 -0.08 *** 0.01 -0.08 *** 0.01 -0.08 *** 0.01 -0.08 *** 0.01
Religiosity 0.05 *** 0.01 0.05 *** 0.01 0.05 *** 0.01 0.05 *** 0.01 0.05 *** 0.01
Context variables                               
Embeddedness -0.09   0.06 -0.09  0.06 -0.09  0.06 -0.09   0.06 -0.09   0.06
% non EU immigrants -0.07   0.06 -0.07  0.06 -0.07  0.06 -0.07   0.06 -0.07   0.06
Cross-level interactions                               
COTR  x embeddedness       0.03 ** 0.01             0.03 *** 0.01
UN x embeddedness.             -0.05 *** 0.01       -0.05 *** 0.01
COTR  x % non-EU immigrants                   -0.02 * 0.01 -0.02 * 0.01
Variance components                             
Residual variance 0.804 *** 0.006 0.804 *** 0.006 0.804 *** 0.006 0.804 *** 0.006 0.805 *** 0.006
Random intercept 0.096 ** 0.030 0.096 ** 0.030 0.096 ** 0.030 0.096 ** 0.030 0.096 ** 0.030
Slope COTR 0.003 ** 0.001 0.002 * 0.001 0.003 ** 0.001 0.003 * 0.001 0.002 * 0.001
Slope UN 0.003 ** 0.001 0.004 ** 0.001 0.001 * 0.001 0.003 ** 0.001 0.001 * 0.001
ICC 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 
Explained variance                      
% reduced variance residual 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 
% reduced variance intercept 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 
% reduced var. slope COTR   0.25 0.00 0.16 0.51 
% reduced var. slope UN   -0.05 0.65 0.01 0.67 
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* p < .05  ** p < .01 *** p < .001              
Source: ESS 2008-2009, own calculations; Ni = 41,965; Nj = 24 
Multiple imputation is used to handle missing data. All entries are standardized effects. 
(COTR = Conformity-Tradition; UN = Universalism) 
